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Increasing the Efficacy and Efficiency 
of Accounting and Control Systems 
in the Department of Defense 
A more effective and efficient use of re-
sources is a common theme today in both the 
private and public sector. It is not clear to us, 
however, that the methods for creating effi-
cacy and efficiency in the private sector are 
directly transferable (or even adaptable) to the 
public sector. In this commentary we discuss 
the general characteristics of the federal gov-
ernment that mitigate directly against creat-
ing more effective and efficient accounting and 
control systems. Our specific focus is the De-
partment of Defense. We present fundamen-
tal differences among the military services 
that could impact proposed changes. We pro-
vide an example of a system that was imple-
mented across the military services. Finally, 
we discuss some reasonable goals for increas-
ing efficacy and efficiency and some factors 
critical to achieving success. 
Within the Department of Defense, there 
are currently programs underway to reduce 
costs by creating common accounting and con-
trol systems across the Air Force, Army, Ma-
rine Corps, and Navy. Although creating com-
monality sounds commendable, it is question-
able whether it is either a good idea or one 
that has any chance of being implemented. 
Why be concerned with the accounting and 
control systems in this single organization? 
Note that the Department of Defense had a 
budget authority of approximately $260 bil-
lion for the 1993 fiscal year, about 20 percent 
of the federal budget and about five percent 
of Gross Domestic Product. 1 The Department 
of Defense employs approximately 950,000 ci-
vilians. Over 100,000 of these employees com-
prise the civilian financial management 
workforce. Approximately 74,000 of these 
employees are working in jobs specifically 
identified as financial management.2 Increas-
ing the effective and efficient use and man-
agement of these resources can represent a 
sizable impact to the taxpayer. 
PROBLEMS IN THE 
MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL AND 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 
SYSTEMS 
There is a well-developed body of research 
that discusses fundamental differences in the 
1These percentages are only approximate. At this writ-
ing, Defense budget authority is expected to decline 
below $250 billion for fiscal year 1994 and beyond, 
while the total federal budget and Gross Domestic 
Product are expected to increase. Hence, these per-
centages will decline. 
2Employment figures are drawn from the Defense Cen-
tral Personnel Data File. The Department of Defense 
financial management workforce data are estimates 
developed by the Center for Na val Analysis from data 
supplied by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of 
the authors and are not necessarily those of any organi-
zation within the federal government. 
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organizational assumptions and characteris-
tics in the profit and nonprofit sectors.3 Al-
though this is a very rich literature, there is 
little evidence that it has affected either deci-
sion making in the federal government or the 
design and operation of accounting and con-
trol systems in the Department of Defense. 
The relevance of this literature is that it ar-
gues forcibly for recognition of the fundamen-
tal differences between the two sectors to en-
sure that methods highly successful in one 
sector are not used naively in the other under 
the assumption of transferability. It is our ex-
perience that past administrations, in at-
tempting to "fix" processes in the federal gov-
ernment by the wholesale adoption of private 
sector solutions, usually ignore fundamental 
differences between the two sectors-the very 
characteristics that generated the problems. 
Characteristics of Federal Management 
of Accounting and Control Systems 
Federal management of accounting and 
control systems has several characteristics 
that are obvious to the interested observer. 
These characteristics include 
• Complex social equity considerations. 
Considerations of social equity are impor-
tant in decisions affecting accounting and 
control systems as well as in other areas 
of government expenditure. Examples are 
small business and minority set-asides and 
the desire for industry "competitiveness" 
in federal government procurement. 
• Long lead times for projects. The lead 
time for developing accounting and control 
systems and acquiring the necessary hard-
ware can be very long. A decade is not an 
uncommon figure in the authors' experi-
ence. In the private sector, this length of 
time would entail the entire lifetime of a 
system, not just its development and ac-
quisition lead time. 
• Fiduciary management dominates fi-
nancial management. Government 
managers take a fiduciary view rather 
than a managerial view. Preventing fraud, 
waste, and abuse with government funds 
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is almost always more important than 
employing those funds to solve problems. 
• Lack of strategic planning. Strategic 
planning is not an institutionalized pro-
cess in the federal government. 4 Manage-
ment systems are organized on a project 
basis. Any new accounting and control sys-
tem is viewed as a project to solve a par-
ticular problem and not as part of an on-
going problem-solving process. 
• Dysfunctional reward systems. Pay 
and status in the federal government are 
directly linked to size of budget and staff 
controlled by an individual manager and 
not to the results produced by that man-
ager with that budget and staff. 
The case of the Social Security 
Administration's benefit payout system is an 
example of the effect of social equity consid-
erations on accounting and control systems. 
The Social Security Administration's auto-
mated benefit payout system was state-of-the-
art when installed in the 1960s, but by the 
early 1980s it was generating numerous er-
rors and customer complaints because of ca-
pacity and technological constraints. In the 
mid-1980s, Congress authorized an upgrade 
to the system but balked at the award of the 
entire contract to a single major supplier of 
automated accounting and control systems. 
This system was subsequently split into seven 
components so that multiple organizations 
could be rewarded contracts. Clearly, Congress 
was not looking at the problem from the point 
of view of efficiency. They focused on the is-
sue of social equity. Additionally, they saw the 
award of a large contract to only one company 
as making the computer systems industry less 
competitive. 
3Examples of the literature include Euske and Euske 
(1991) and Scott (1987). 
4Although the Planning, Programming, and Budget-
ing System (PPBS) in the Department of Defense was 
created more than 30 years ago to address this and 
other problems, the planning portion of PPBS has be-
come, at best, an intermediate-term system. For vari-
ous reasons not germane to this discussion, PPBS does 
not scan the long-run, external environment for po-
tential problems and opportunities. 
T 
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The considerations of social equity and 
diverse goals within the government contrib-
ute to the creation of complex systems with 
long lead times. Negotiations must take place 
before Congress or federal administrators can 
arrive at a solution accepted as fair by all. 
Federal government procurement practices 
have institutionalized these political negotia-
tions into a complex competitive bidding sys-
tem costly to the government, vendors, and 
ultimately to the taxpayers. 
Fiduciary concerns influence the decision 
process. In the private sector, it is often 
cheaper to replace an obsolete system than to 
continue paying the costs to operate it. The 
government manager, however, perceives a 
different set of costs than a private sector 
manager. In the federal government, one of 
the major categories of costs for a new system 
is those costs associated with justifying the 
new system. Because of the extensive system 
of checks and balances required for spending 
public money, justifying a new system involves 
considerable administrative time and expense. 
The manager must divert a large share of the 
staff's energies into tedious paperwork to meet 
the requirements of the system of checks and 
balances. This administrative cost is difficult 
to compute explicitly, but we believe it is sig-
nificant. Thus, the true cost ofreplacing a gov-
ernment system tends to be much higher than 
for a similar system in the private sector. 
Managers in the federal government and 
the Department of Defense are acutely aware 
of the effect of the fiduciary concerns. Pro-
grams started during the Bush administra-
tion, such as the Defense Business Operations 
Fund and Corporate Information Manage-
ment, are attempts to address the effects of 
fiduciary concerns, among other issues. These 
programs, although valuable, are in some 
ways examples of questionable transference 
of profit-sector methods to the public sector. 
The basic idea behind both programs is to run 
the Department of Defense "like a business." 
If being "like a business" helps individuals to 
eliminate waste and work more effectively and 
efficiently, that is beneficial. However, such 
programs can be dysfunctional in that trying 
to be "like a business" masks fundamental el-
ements of the government environment. For 
instance, the Defense Business Operations 
Fund is implicitly based on the premises of 
consumer sovereignty and free competition. 
These premises simply do not apply to all of 
the areas in which the program is being used. 5 
If military specifications (MILSPECs) are re-
quired, consumer sovereignty is lost; if only a 
single internal provider of goods and services 
is available, free competition is eliminated. 
Without consumer sovereignty and free com-
petition, it is unclear whether the Defense 
Business Operations Fund is viable. 
Corporate Information Management, 
championed by a political appointee hired 
from General Motors and modelled after the 
General Motors' information management 
program, has two thrusts. The first is to re-
duce duplication and unnecessary redundancy 
in information systems and computer hard-
ware in the Department of Defense-a very 
sensible effort. The second is reengineering 
"business" practices. Reengineering is worth-
while as long as the reengineering takes into 
account fundamental elements of the govern-
ment environment; however, it is not clear 
that care is being taken to keep such key ele-
ments visible.6 
The strategic planning process in the fed-
eral government is weak. There is general ac-
ceptance in the private sector of the necessity 
of top management involvement in strategic 
planning in order to have successful financial 
management systems. However, the federal 
government has problems of continuity in top 
management that private industry does not 
have. 
The entire top management structure of 
the federal government can change every four 
5See testimony by James L. Blum, Deputy Director, 
Congressional Budget Office before the Subcommit-
tee on Readiness of the Committee on Armed Services 
of the U.S. House of Representatives, May 13, 1993. 
60ur purpose is not to support or condemn any par-
ticular program currently underway that is designed 
to increase effectiveness and efficiency in the Depart-
ment of Defense; rather, our purpose is to improve 
understanding of what it takes to increase effective-
ness and efficiency. 
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years. It might be argued that this should not 
be a problem. After all, corporate management 
teams change frequently, and they are still 
able to set up strategic planning procedures. 
But the process by which changes occur in cor-
porate management is different from govern-
ment. In government, a new management 
team comes to power by discrediting the poli-
cies of the old team. By implication, the old 
team is incompetent and replacement is the 
only cure, analogous to an unfriendly corpo-
rate takeover. In most corporate management 
changes, however, the old management team 
has had a mentor relationship with the new 
team. Because change is more gradual and or-
derly, there is much greater continuity in poli-
cies and procedures. The new management 
team understands those policies and the pro-
cedures derived from the policies. The new 
corporate management team does not require 
the setup time that a new government admin-
istration requires before they can become fully 
functional. 
The result in the federal government is 
that planning, if any, is dependent on indi-
vidual management styles. It is not a routine 
procedure in the organization. Perhaps the 
current incumbent in a job sees a need for 
long-range planning and pursues it. That 
individual's successor may be unfamiliar with 
the situation and may have a different set of 
priorities, abandoning the plans in process 
before they can have any effect. This problem 
is exacerbated by the high turnover in high-
level government management (Collins 1982, 
37).7 As Collins argues, 
Average tenures were so short that even fully 
qualified civilians and military men found it 
almost impossible to promulgate cohesive 
policies and programs, much less pursue 
them to successful conclusions (105). 
Even if the rate of management turnover 
were lower, the long-range planning process 
would still be difficult to establish in govern-
ment, due to the absence of mentor relation-
ships and an institutionalized planning 
process. It can be argued that the Chief Fi-
nancial Officers Act passed by Congress in 
1990 directly addresses this problem by insti-
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tutionalizing the preparation of five-year fi-
nancial plans (Jones and McCaffery 1992). Al-
though creation of plans is mandated, 
mentoring relationships are lacking and the 
periodic abrupt changes in power remain. 
The determination of pay for a given posi-
tion is a function of a number of factors, such 
as number of individuals supervised, location 
of the individuals, and tasks performed by the 
individuals. In our experience, however, man-
agers increase their pay and status within the 
federal government by increasing the number 
of personnel and amount of resources they 
control. For instance, doubling the number of 
individuals who operate an accounting and 
control system from 100 to 200 will most likely 
result in more compensation for the manager 
of the system. Conversely, reducing the num-
ber of personnel necessary to operate an ac-
counting and control system will most likely 
lead to a decrease in compensation for the 
manager of the system. Workers face a simi-
lar situation in that increases in efficiency 
may lead to their being relocated or dis-
charged. Such an incentive structure does not 
support increasing efficiency. 
Some people view these problems as iso-
lated symptoms that can be corrected merely 
by solving each one individually. Corporate 
Information Management, the Defense Busi-
ness Operations Fund, and the Chief Finan-
cial Officers Act are examples of such think-
ing. The symptoms, however, are not indepen-
dent; they are interdependent characteristics 
of the process surrounding federal financial 
management. Any solution to the problems of 
federal accounting and control systems man-
agement must address the considerations that 
generated them. Solutions not considering this 
fundamental aspect of federal accounting and 
control systems management will surely fail, 
and they have. 
7Collins presents statistics on Department of Defense 
political appointees' tenure in office from World War 
II through 1982. The average terms of office for the 
different political positions listed ranged between 1.7 
years and 4 years. The longest tenure in office was 10 
years. The shortest term in office was 2 months. 
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Some Differences in Department of 
Defense Cultures 
Even if the characteristics that affect the 
federal government are understood, specific 
characteristics and traditions of the military 
services inhibit planned change and integra-
tion. The characteristics and traditions are not 
problems per se; ignoring them, however, can 
make them problems. In The Masks of War, 
Carl Builder (1989) describes the different 
identities and personalities of the three mili-
tary services. We do the same here, but we 
focus on those elements that have ramifica-
tions for alternative approaches by the ser-
vices to accounting and control systems, and 
these are discussed in the next section. 
The Navy views itself as possessing two 
strong characteristics: stature and indepen-
dence. These two characteristics make the 
Navy a very tradition-oriented service; it car-
ries on the honored traditions established by 
the Royal Navy hundreds of years ago. Per-
haps the most important part of this tradi-
tion is that of independent command at sea, 
whereby the captain of a ship sent on a long 
mission was responsible for every action and 
consequence that fell under his command. The 
best example of this is Commodore Perry's 
opening of Japan in the nineteenth century, 
where he acted as presidential emissary, sec-
retary of state, commander-in-chief, ambas-
sador, and trade commissioner. Reflecting this 
tradition, the Navy tends to rely on decentral-
ized control of activities with independence 
of action expected at lower levels of the 
organization. 
The Army sees itself as the artisans of war, 
forged by history and the nature ofland com-
bat into a mutually supporting brotherhood 
of guilds. Builder argues that the three 
branches of combat arms (infantry, artillery, 
and armor) are guilds, because they function 
as associations of craftspeople who take great 
pride in their skills instead of possessions or 
positions. These three guilds function as a 
brotherhood because they must depend on 
each other in combat since no one branch can 
provide all the elements of combat power. Ad-
ditionally, the three branches have a common 
family bond, the Army, with the primary mo-
tivator for members of the Army being ser-
vice to their country. Due to this interrelation-
ship of the combat arms, decision-making in 
the Army tends to be centralized. Moreover, 
because the Army is more sensitive than the 
other services to the necessity of not appear-
ing as an internal threat, it tends to be the 
most cooperative in responding to external 
requests. 
The Air Force views air power as the deci-
sive instrument of warfare. Since air power is 
sustained and nurtured by modern technol-
ogy, the Air Force becomes the embodiment of 
technology in supporting its mission of air 
power. This focus on technology pervades the 
Air Force: quality is chosen over quantity and 
decisions are analytically based and supported 
by technology. The Air Force uses its technol-
ogy to maintain centralized control over issues 
of mission importance. 
Because these characteristics and tradi-
tions of each service result from the different 
service personalities, the services can be ex-
pected to treat "common" systems in different 
ways. Of course, service personality is not the 
sole cause of the military departments treat-
ing common systems in different ways; the 
military departments are very large organi-
zations, and organizational inertia is a signifi-
cant factor in inhibiting change. 
The Three Faces of a Common System 
The differences among the military ser-
vices do appear to influence the efficacy and 
efficiency of implementing and operating ac-
counting and control systems. We use the 
implementation and operation of the Produc-
tivity Enhancement Capital Investment 
(PECI) program to illustrate the impact of ser-
vice differences. Because this program was 
instituted over a decade ago, there has been 
sufficient time for the impact of the differences 
to be evident. The PECI program is a funding 
program administered by the Defense Produc-
tivity Program Office. The program was es-
tablished in 1979 to improve the capital stock 
of Department of Defense industrial facilities. 
It was designed to enable managers to make 
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timely investments in equipment and facili-
ties, which increased outputs of an organiza-
tion in relationship to inputs. 
The program had separate funding sources 
depending upon the cost of investment. 
Projects costing less than $100,000 were eli-
gible for "fast payback" funds parked at the 
respective military departments. The depart-
ments evaluated projects using investment 
criteria and dispensed funds according to 
available resources and productivity strate-
gies. Funding could be received within six 
months of a request. Projects costing more 
than $100,000 were eligible for the Produc-
tivity Investment Fund (PIF), which was ad-
ministered by the Defense Productivity Pro-
gram Office. There was a competitive review 
of projects submitted by the military depart-
ments and defense agencies prior to funding 
and a two-year time lag between submission 
and funding. 
The two programs were created to be 
complementary in nature to assist with the 
design of a capital investment program aimed 
at productivity enhancement. Equipment that 
improved productivity of individual employ-
ees could usually be purchased using the "fast 
payback" funds, while PIF could be applied 
towards projects that improved the productiv-
ity of entire work units. 
An analysis of these two programs 
(Whipple and LaPatra 1983), completed after 
the programs had been in operation for four 
years, argued that the programs had the po-
tential to significantly impact productivity of 
the military services. The analysts also argued 
that it was too early to evaluate the program. 
This somewhat optimistic evaluation com-
pleted during the early stages of a federal pro-
gram is not unique to the analysis of PECI 
and PIF.8 
Although PIF was administered centrally 
in the Department of Defense, PIF implemen-
tation structure was determined by the indi-
vidual services. The decentralized implemen-
tation structure allowed for service diversity 
in operating programs.9 The differences in pro-
gram management were very clear-cut. 
Consistent with its tradition of being co-
operative and responsive, the Army kept the 
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program visible and free of rough spots. The 
Anny ran the program from its central head-
quarters. Personnel were available to consult, 
educate, and generally assist ·users. Major 
commands used incentive programs and sim-
plified administration, and local resource 
managers marketed the program and pro-
vided consultation and training in documen-
tation. The Anny had an integrated program 
management structure, so that PIF "snow-
balled" into a significant funding program. 
The Air Force received far less funding 
from the PIF than Anny, but the program was 
managed efficiently with a balanced approach. 
Air Force financial managers were adept at 
analyzing the selection criteria of the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense and documenting 
PIF projects to maximize funding; PIF was 
used most often for military construction 
projects. Although the dollar amount of the Air 
Force program was modest, it was managed 
for high effectiveness. The Air Force manage-
ment was technically efficient with a rapid 
response time. 
The Navy spread management of the pro-
gram across three different offices, which not 
only made coordination difficult but also dif-
fused program responsibility. The program 
was not well known within the Navy, and us-
ers were untrained in technical aspects of the 
8Similarly, there are those who argued that the Grace 
Commission during the Reagan administration had 
the potential to increase the efficacy and efficiency of 
the federal government. Likewise, there are those who 
argue that the programs initiated and legislation 
passed during the Bush administration, such as the 
Defense Business Operating Fund, Corporate Infor-
mation Management, and the Chief Financial Offic-
ers' Act of 1990, discussed previously, will increase the 
efficiency of the federal government. Even more re-
cently, the "Reinventing Government" program un-
veiled by President Clinton in September 1993 is seen 
as the means to increase the efficacy and efficiency of 
the federal government. Today, however, few would 
argue that the Grace Commission had any real im-
pact. In our view, it is too soon to evaluate the results 
of the initiatives begun during the Bush and Clinton 
administrations. 
9The authors researched the impediments to usage of 
the PIF portion of Department of Defense's PECI pro-
gram. The research focussed on the military depart-
ments within the Department of Defense. The results 
of that project are reported in Boger et al. (1988). 
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program. In general Navy had a limited com-
mitment to PIF. Consistent with its traditions, 
it used decentralized program control. 10 
It is interesting to contrast Navy program 
management with that of the Marine Corps, 
a component of the Department of the Navy. 
Although the Marine Corps seldom requested 
PIF funds, program management was well 
defined. Responsibility was centralized at 
Commandant, Marine Corps, and implemen-
tation instructions were explicit. Marine 
Corps' internal review practices resulted in 
the most accurate accountability data of all 
program participants. 
Each military service implemented a com-
mon system differently. It is not an exaggera-
tion to say that the implementation differed 
to the extent that, moving from service to ser-
vice, an individual might not recognize, much 
less be able to use, the common program. How-
ever, it would be inaccurate to suggest that a 
service tried not to be as effective and efficient 
as possible. But it is clear that the inherent 
differences among the services did affect the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the program. 
INCREASING EFFICACY AND 
EFFICIENCY 
The characteristics of the military services 
and of accounting and control systems in the 
federal environment can inhibit orderly and 
necessary change. Systems or proposals for 
systems that ignore these characteristics are 
usually not successful. However, designing a 
system to function within the constraints im-
posed by these interdependent characteristics, 
although not a trivial problem, can result in 
increases in efficacy and efficiency. 
For instance, an example of a common ac-
counting and control system that has a high 
probability of working is the one used for ci-
vilian pay in the Department of Defense. His-
torically, each service administered its own 
civilian pay system. Currently, a single civil-
ian pay system is being implemented for the 
entire Department of Defense by the Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service, which was 
created in 1991 to increase the efficacy and 
efficiency of the services' accounting opera-
tions. In contrast to PIF, which was imple-
mented differently by each service, the civil-
ian pay systems-the computers, facilities, 
and personnel-were essentially taken away 
from the services to be run by the Department 
of Defense. The plan being implemented speci-
fies that each service will feed data to a com-
mon system and not run its own version of a 
common system. It is likely the new system 
will survive the change of administration that 
occurred in 1993 because of the major modifi-
cation to the structure of the organization. Put 
another way, the radical realignment of the 
"ownership" of resources has probably insti-
tutionalized the change. However, even with 
the major organizational and legal changes in 
place to decrease waste and increase effective-
ness and efficiency, achieving that end is not 
a foregone conclusion. 
How else, besides radical realignment of 
resources, can systems that increase efficacy 
and efficiency be institutionalized? Probably 
not by edict, given that the edicts are changed 
from administration to administration. Our 
experience is that changes have been institu-
tionalized within the military services by suc-
cessfully converting one or more of the follow-
ing groups: 
• the officer corps, particularly the flag of-
ficers (i.e., admirals and generals), 
• the career civilian government managers, 
• the government workforce. 
Each of the three groups has the power to ef-
fect system success by recognizing the char-
10Navy participation in PIF is difficult to characterize. 
While program usage was much smaller thanAir Force 
or Army, a head-to-head comparison is unfair because 
a Navy reorganization occurred after the inception of 
the program. The component that had been tasked 
with PIF management, Navy Material Command, was 
abolished in the reorganization. The large users of PIF 
traditionally had been subcomponents of the Navy 
Materiel Command. After the reorganization there was 
a general halt in PIF ,participation; regulations were 
no longer applicable, and program knowledge was dis-
persed. Additionally, other sources were available to 
obtain funding for PECI-type projects. However, dis-
regarding the impact of the reorganization, other man-
agement aspects affected Navy participation; only 
those aspects are addressed in this commentary. 
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acteristics previously discussed and incorpo-
rating them into the proposed change. 
High-ranking officers control the flow of 
resources within the services. System change 
and implementation can be either fostered or 
hindered by the resource allocation process. 
If supported, the new system may be able to 
be on line before a change in administration. 
If hindered long enough, the new system never 
gets completely implemented, the administra-
tion changes, and the system becomes lost in 
the flurry of initiatives from the new admin-
istration. Not only do the high-ranking offic-
ers control resource allocation, they also pro-
vide the strategic direction for the organiza-
ti9n. The officers, as a group, are the highest 
level permanent management in each ser-
vice.11 The civilians they answer to are mostly 
political appointees that change with each new 
administration or political faux pas. 
Career civilian government managers tend 
to be the permanent management staff of in-
dividual government facilities, particularly 
outside of the Washington, D. C. area; their 
military supervisors rotate on a two-to three-
year cycle. Civilian managers often can stall 
a project until new military supervision is in 
place or until a new administration is elected. 
On the other hand, the career civilian man-
agers can support a program and foster change 
before a new local military manager is in place 
or a new administration is elected. The lon-
gevity of career government managers is such 
that they can realize the delayed payoffs re-
sulting from the long lead times for projects. 
This is in contrast to local military managers 
and political appointees, whose tenure is much 
shorter and whose reward structure is not 
likely to focus on long-term payoffs. 
Finally, the civilian workforce of nearly one 
million individuals in the Department of De-
fense has the power to make or break a sys-
tem. They work in virtually all the organiza-
tions in the Department of Defense. By work-
ing to the rule, they can destroy most any sys-
tem. Yet, if the workforce gives its full sup-
port, even a weak system might succeed. 'lb 
help garner this support, the incentive system 
must reward those individuals who become 
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more efficient and possibly work themselves 
out of specific jobs. Gaining the support of the 
civilian work force is one of the apparent 
strengths of Clinton's effort to "Reinvent 
Government" (Salwen 1993). 
In the capital investment program ex-
ample, career managers essentially brokered 
the program. They sold the program to senior 
officers and developed the implementation 
strategies for the respective services. In those 
services where the program was a viable 
source of capital investment, senior officers 
determined the amount of command involve-
ment. They set the investment strategies and 
gave support for the program. Where the pro-
gram was ineffective, there was a lack of in-
terest from senior officers, career managers, 
and the civilian workforce. It was not until 
senior officers became aware of the lack of 
participation in PECI that program involve-
ment increased. 
Accounting and control systems in the 
Department of Defense can be changed and 
improved. The civilian pay system is an ex-
ample. The system has been structured so that 
there is strong central control over system 
resources. This has reduced the variability 
inherent in most financial management sys-
tems that the services "fit" into their respec-
tive missions. This was possible, at least in 
part, because the civilian pay system does not 
have a strong institutional flavor: civilian pay 
for the Navy is not appreciably different from 
the Army or Air Force. On the other hand, 
capital investment programs do have strong 
mhision-related differences, and individual 
implementation of a common system permit-
ted the distinct service personalities to have 
a strong influence. For these systems to work, 
both senior officers and career managers need 
to be brought on board in the early stages of 
planning. Their involvement is necessary both 
to tailor the system to the services' require-
11The importance of this group and their ability to set a 
tone for the organization can be seen in the "Tailhook" 
episode. Senior officers apparently had knowledge of 
the behaviors exhibited at the annual conventions and, 
at least passively, allowed behavior to continue that 
some individuals consider to be inappropriate. 
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ments and to implement the system within 
the institutional structure. These two groups 
may not be able to alter the characteristics of 
federal financial management, but together 
they have the resources to address the prob-
lems created by the characteristics. 
'lb reiterate our earlier point, without ac-
counting for the interdependent characteris-
tics of the processes surrounding federal finan-
cial management, increasing the efficacy and 
efficiency of accounting and control systems 
will be difficult to achieve. Individuals may 
argue that the characteristics presented are 
substantially different from those found in the 
private sector. Clearly, there are private sec-
tor organizations in the service sector that 
have diverse and seemingly independent goals 
yet are still able to operate with a high de-
gree of efficacy and efficiency. However, in the 
private sector each decision has a potential 
impact on the long-run profitability and ulti-
mately the survival of the organization. This 
is not the case in the federal government-
the focus in the federal government is on mis-
sion-related goals, not long-run profitability. 
Unless the interdependent characteristics of 
federal financial management are acknowl-
edged and incorporated in the planning pro-
cess, common systems will continue to be un-
common in the Department of Defense. 
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